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NUDGE-PROOF: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE
ETHICS OF NUDGING
Jessica L. Roberts*
The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behav-
ioral Science. By Cass R. Sunstein. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 2016. Pp. ix, 202. $29.99.
Introduction
Nudges—factors that influence behavior while maintaining choice—are
everywhere. And they can apparently get us to do all kinds of things that we
might not ordinarily do,1 like eat chicken livers,2 wake up early,3 or join a
Facebook group for scrapbooking enthusiasts.4
According to Cass R. Sunstein,5 one of the world’s foremost scholars on
nudging, nudges are “choice-preserving, low-cost tools” (p. 5) to influence
behavior positively.6 Nudges harness the power of choice architecture to in-
fluence people’s decisions. Choice architecture refers to “the background
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1. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Nudges, 95 Tex. L.
Rev. 1061, 1066 (2017) (reviewing The Ethics of Influence) (“Nudges can get millions to behave
in ways that they otherwise would not.”).
2. See Sarah Kershaw, Using Menu Psychology to Entice Diners, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/dining/23menus.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
3. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 44–45 (2008) (describing “Clocky,” an alarm clock
that forces people to get up in the morning by moving around the room, as a nudge).
4. See Barbara Ortutay & Michael Liedtke, Facebook Wants to Nudge You into ‘Meaning-
ful’ Online Groups, Associated Press (June 22, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/713f8f66e88
b45828fd62b1693652ee7 [https://perma.cc/8QUP-JQTP]. For an example of such a group, see
The Scrapbooking Club, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/TheScrapbookingClub/ [https:/
/perma.cc/BT2X-49CZ].
5. Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
6. In their blockbuster 2008 book Nudge, Sunstein and coauthor Richard Thaler defined
nudges more neutrally, as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives,” not just those that do good. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis
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conditions for people’s choices” (p. 5). Our decisions do not occur in a
vacuum. Take the seemingly simple decision of what to eat for lunch at a
restaurant. The ways in which the restaurant presents the available choices—
whether printing them on individual menus, listing them on a chalkboard,
or having a server describe them—is the choice architecture behind your
lunch order.
Not only are nudges ubiquitous, they are also inescapable. Because all
choices have context, choice architecture is unavoidable.7 The restaurant has
to put the items on the menu in some order, and that order will affect what
people decide to eat (p. 35). Insofar as it influences our behavior, even the
weather is arguably a type of choice architecture (p. 35). When crafted in-
tentionally, nudges capitalize on the reality that the circumstances under
which people make decisions can have a powerful impact on what they
decide.8
Yet it was only in the past ten years that governments attempted to real-
ize the power of choice architecture. Ever since, nudging has been hailed as a
sort of policy panacea, able to address some of society’s stickiest problems—
from the obesity epidemic to the energy crisis to the lack of retirement sav-
ings. President Obama jumped on the nudge bandwagon, establishing the
White House’s Social and Behavioral Science Team (p. 8) and issuing an
executive order9 requiring federal agencies to design and implement policies
based on insights from behavioral economics and psychology. (Sunstein
himself served as administrator of the White House Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs from 2009 to 2012.) The United States was not the
first to engage in these efforts. Nudges as policy interventions have made a
splash worldwide. The governments of other affluent, industrialized na-
tions—mainly the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Denmark, Sweden,
Canada, Singapore, Israel, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Mexico—have
also embraced nudges to improve the lives of their citizens.10
While the Trump Administration may not keep President Obama’s team
and infrastructure intact, a complete move away from nudges of all kinds
seems unlikely and shortsighted. Research shows surprisingly strong biparti-
san support for many nudges.11 Thus, in this era of extreme political divi-
siveness, nudges may actually represent an opportunity for consensus across
party lines, making them more important now than ever as tools for poli-
cymaking. Whether you are on the left or on the right, nudges can help you
added). In subsequent work, however, Sunstein has limited nudges to “initiatives that maintain
freedom of choice while also steering people’s decisions in the right direction (as judged by the
people themselves).” Cass R. Sunstein, Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Pater-
nalism 17 (2014) (emphasis added).
7. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 16, 118; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 3, 237.
8. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 14.
9. Appendix C, p. 214–16.
10. Pp. 8–9; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, 11–12.
11. Appendix A, p. 203–08.
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get what you want. Perhaps nudges could offer solutions on such conten-
tious issues as healthcare12 and climate change.13
When used as policy interventions, nudges are based on the core insight
of behavioral economics—that human beings do not always act in our own
long-term best interests. We are subject to several well-documented cogni-
tive quirks that lead us down the path of less than perfect decisionmaking.14
Nudges can help people avoid what behavioral economists call “behavioral
market failures” and, in the process, advance prosocial goals.15
In his latest book on the subject, The Ethics of Influence: Government in
the Age of Behavioral Science, Sunstein takes a deeper dive into government
efforts to nudge its citizens. Sunstein points out that, while for-profit com-
panies, charities, and even self-help gurus readily employ nudges to influ-
ence behavior, when the state adopts these measures it can raise unique
ethical concerns (pp. 13–15). So how do we know when a government’s
attempts to influence its citizens are ethical? As his framework, Sunstein of-
fers four guiding values: (1) welfare, (2) autonomy, (3) dignity, and (4) self-
government.16 He argues that these four values should constrain govern-
ments and inform the actions of the ethical state.
Despite its theoretical elegance and flexibility, Sunstein’s framework,
like nearly all the literature on nudging, relies on one crucial and often un-
spoken assumption: people are “nudge-able.”17 In other words, they are sus-
ceptible to influence. But being nudge-able requires access to meaningful
choices and the freedom to make those choices.18
Scholars outside the realm of behavioral economics have long recog-
nized that the control we exert over our lives varies from person to person
and from context to context, leaving some individuals with far fewer op-
tions. Put simply, we are not all equally autonomous. Any number of factors
may limit our range of choices. For example, a food label indicating a prod-
uct contains GMOs does little to affect the decision of a person who cannot
12. See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 Wash. L. Rev.
1255 (2017); Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, SSRN (July 20, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009823 [https://perma.cc/BQB3-4HLQ]. See
generally Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics (I. Glenn Cohen et
al. eds., 2016).
13. Sunstein uses the examples of gray versus green energy throughout the book. See,
e.g., pp. 124, 159, 164, 172.
14. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 6–8.
15. See David A. Hyman & Thomas S. Ulen, What Can PPACA Teach Us About Behav-
ioral Law and Economics?, in Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics,
supra note 12, at 59.
16. P. 3; see also infra Section II.A.
17. Although sometimes, it is explicit. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 37 (re-
ferring to people as “nudge-able”).
18. For a similar argument I have made previously along with a coauthor, see Jessica L.
Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May Undermine Wellness Programs, 27
Health Matrix 101 (2017).
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read. A grocery store that prominently features healthy foods will not en-
courage a person to buy more fruits and vegetables if she simply cannot
afford them. A pension plan that automatically deducts from a lower-in-
come worker’s paycheck will funnel her money away from immediate neces-
sities, such as food or rent, and could have little or no ultimate benefit
because poverty shortens her life expectancy. While advocates of nudging
might point out that she could opt out of the pension, the worker might not
be aware of its detrimental impact, or her relative lack of free time and
resources could make opting out significantly more challenging for her than
an affluent person, a phenomenon known in economics as an “effort tax”
(p. 175). Thus, some individuals may make decisions that do not further
their long-term interests—not because of cognitive errors and biases but
because of structural barriers and social constraints.
Because we are not all equally autonomous, we are not all equally
nudge-able. In fact, some populations, particularly the most vulnerable
among us, may even be “nudge-proof” in certain contexts. For members of
these populations, no amount of subtle prodding or thoughtful construction
of defaults will get to the desired result. This reality raises an important
question: Is it ethical to adopt social policies that threaten to leave behind
our citizens who are in the greatest need?
In all of the rich, ongoing discourse surrounding nudges and their eth-
ics, to date no one has taken a close look at their distributional implications.
This lack of scholarly attention represents a significant gap in the literature
surrounding choice architecture. Failing to explicitly acknowledge that some
people are nudge-proof threatens to erase them from the conversation, pos-
sibly leading to even greater inequalities in our already economically po-
larized nation.19
To his credit, Sunstein alludes to these concerns at various points
throughout the book.20 He does so, however, as part of his discussion of the
four guiding values, particularly autonomy, dignity, and welfare. While Sun-
stein advocates convincingly for his four guiding values for ethical nudging,
this Review argues that a fifth value—distributive justice—is equally impor-
tant. Thus, it accepts Sunstein’s framework and builds off of it to address the
distributional implications of nudging. In so doing, I assert that, regardless
of their Pareto impacts, nudges that fail to help the neediest citizens or that
reduce those citizens’ relative welfare are potentially ethically problematic.
Importantly, I do not reject nudges outright, nor do I argue that distributive
justice should be dispositive. Rather, I seek to encourage would-be nudgers
to engage more deeply with distributional concerns.
The argument for considering the role of distributive justice in nudges
proceeds in three parts. Part I describes why nudges can be effective and
19. See Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for
the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 2016), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w22945 [https://perma.cc/X4YW-5HXM] (demonstrating the widening
income gap in the United States).
20. See infra Section II.B.
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desirable policy interventions. Part II turns to the ethics of nudging, outlin-
ing Sunstein’s four-value framework and demonstrating how even seemingly
ethical nudges can raise distributional concerns. Finally, Part III proposes
distributive justice as a fifth value for ethical nudges and explores how con-
sideration of this additional value can lead to nudges that improve the lives
of all Americans.
I. What Nudges Are and Why Nudges Work . . . Sometimes
Nudges can include any number of interventions, such as default rules,
disclosures, and warnings, and they can span a wide range of topic areas, like
fuel efficiency, health care, and retirement savings.21 Although, at first blush,
it might seem that almost anything could count as a potential nudge, the
term—as used by Sunstein—actually applies only to initiatives that have a
particular set of characteristics and that operate in a specific way. Thus,
before considering the ethics of nudges and their potential distributive im-
plications, we need a working definition. So what is a nudge and why do
nudges work?
A. Why Nudges are Effective Policy Interventions
As noted, nudges are “choice-preserving, low-cost tools” (p. 5) that en-
courage people to make better decisions. Maintaining the freedom to choose
is essential to the nudging process. Sunstein explains that “[n]udges steer
people in particular directions but also allow them to go their own way” (p.
20). Importantly, nudges are not mandates or bans.22 They do not offer sub-
sidies, nor do they impose significant costs (p. 21). Nudges must then be
both cheap and avoidable. They do not bribe, mandate, or coerce.
Nudges attempt to steer people in the right direction (at least as per-
ceived by the nudger—although Sunstein is adamant that true nudges will
make people better off “as judged by themselves”23) by using observations
about how human beings think and behave. Depending on the case, the
right direction might mean avoiding harm to an individual (e.g., lowering
health risk), conferring a benefit on an individual (e.g., encouraging retire-
ment savings), or improving overall social welfare (e.g., increasing green-
energy use).24 In The Ethics of Influence, a GPS system functions as both an
example of a nudge that guides people toward a desired destination and as a
metaphor for nudging generally (pp. 27–28, 44, 49, 54–56, 60, 69). A GPS—
like many other kinds of nudges—does not tell people their desired destina-
tion but instead suggests a route, which they are free to reject, that can get
them to where they want to go (pp. 55–56).
21. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 12.
22. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 6.
23. Id. at 5.
24. See p. 31.
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One foundational tenet of nudging is that people are error prone and
frequently act against their own long-term self-interests. Human beings can
be shortsighted and impulsive.25 For example, imagine a person who wants
to lose weight is planning to have a yogurt for breakfast and then head to the
gym. As she is getting ready to go, her friends text her that they are headed
to a carb-heavy brunch with flowing mimosas. She—like many of us—
might well be tempted to put that yogurt back in the fridge and save the
workout for tomorrow. Is she being irrational? After all, she wants to lose
weight, and certainly pancakes, champagne, and not exercising do not serve
that goal. While being fit and thin might be her long-term preference, her
short-term preference is to eat delicious food and have fun with her friends.
Her decision is then not irrational per se. What then are her true prefer-
ences?26 Economists would say that she is exhibiting “bounded rationality”:
her decision is rational in the moment yet does not serve her in the longer
term.27
Short-term decisions, like choosing a boozy brunch over the gym, can
add up, leading people either to act in a way that could harm them over time
(e.g., a high-calorie diet) or to fail to act in a way that could benefit them
over time (e.g., going to the gym).28 These little deviations from our in-
tended path constitute behavioral market failures. As Sunstein explains, be-
havioral market failures “occur when people make decisions that reduce
their own welfare” (p. 19). After enough of these choices add up, people may
ask themselves: How did I end up so far off from where I want to be?
It turns out that there are some clear answers to when—and why—
human beings make choices that fail to serve our long-term goals. Research
shows that people make self-defeating decisions under predictable sets of
circumstances—when decisions test our self-control, when decisions are
complex or difficult, when decisions do not provide the opportunity for us
to learn from our previous choices, or when decisions are infrequent or
unfamiliar.29 Behavioral market failures may occur under these conditions
because of normal human cognitive functioning. At least two different oper-
ating systems make up the human mind: “System 1, which is fast, automatic,
and intuitive, and System 2, which is slow, calculative, and deliberative.”30
25. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 9.
26. Scenarios like this one are precisely what makes the “as judged by themselves” stan-
dard so tricky. For more examples, see pp. 46–48.
27. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 11. Some scholars also distinguish between first-order
preferences and second-order preferences (i.e. preferences about preferences). Sunstein ex-
plains, “People might want to buy a lot of new clothes, or to watch a lot of television, but they
might want not to want those things.” P. 48.
28. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 35.
29. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 73–76.
30. P. 28; see also Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 19–22 (describing System 1 as an
Automatic System that is “intuitive and automatic” and System 2 as a Reflective System that is
“reflective and rational”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 26–27 (describing differences between
Systems 1 and 2). For more on Systems 1 and 2, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking,
Fast and Slow (2011).
April 2018] Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging 1051
System 1 can be immensely useful for the quick processing of small, frequent
decisions. Yet System 1 can sometimes lead us astray. It may cause us to
focus too much on the short-term (like our bruncher), to be unrealistically
optimistic, or to misapprehend risk.31 If people would instead engage with
System 2 when making their decisions, they might have better long-term
outcomes.32
Proponents of nudging like Sunstein believe that, as a matter of public
policy, the government should intervene to attempt to remedy our behav-
ioral market failures.33 Nudges target those situations in which individuals
are least likely to make the choice that best serves them.34
B. Some Illustrative Examples
In sum, nudges are a type of policy intervention, which influence behav-
ior while preserving choice, in response to various self-defeating tendencies
in human reasoning. Nudges can achieve their desired ends in a variety of
ways. Sunstein explains: “Some nudges work because they inform people.
Others work because they make certain choices easier; people often choose
the path of least resistance. Some such nudges, such as default rules, work
because of the power of inertia and procrastination. Some nudges work be-
cause of social influences” (p. 21). Given the seemingly endless opportuni-
ties to nudge and the numerous nudging strategies available to
policymakers,35 perhaps the best way to understand what constitutes a nudge
and how nudges work is through some examples.
Throughout the book, Sunstein offers examples of the use of nudges by
policymakers. Well-known nudges include requiring chain restaurants to
post calorie labels, placing graphic warnings on packs of cigarettes,36 and
automatically enrolling people in savings plans but giving them the ability to
opt out.37 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s slogan “[k]now
before you owe” appears to encourage clarity and simplification to allow
consumers to comparison shop effectively38 (p. 7).
Nudges can be broken down into at least two different categories:
nudges that engage System 2 deliberation, like the calorie labels or financial
31. P. 29; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 9, 154.
32. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 154.
33. Put differently, behavioral market failures justify government paternalism. See id. at
4–5, 16, 20, 22, 34–35, 164.
34. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 72.
35. Id. at 157.
36. At least one federal court, however, has held such labels to be unconstitutional. See
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
37. P. 121. Other “classic nudges” described in the book include avoiding tax evasion
(appealing to conscience), smoking discouragement (graphic warnings), cafeteria (accessibil-
ity), energy conservation (social norms), and food labeling (disclosure. Pp. 136–37.
38. P. 7 (quoting Know Before You Owe: Credit Cards, CFPB, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/credit-card-data/know-you-owe-credit-cards/
[https://perma.cc/R5Z9-Y23F]).
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information, and nudges that exploit System 1 automatic thinking, like the
graphic cigarette warning or the automatic savings-plan enrollment. Sun-
stein calls nudges that trigger System 2 “educative nudges” or “boosts” (pp.
12, 30, 32). Boosts give people access to more information or increase their
competence to allow them to make better choices on their own (pp. 30, 32).
These kinds of motivating nudges can take several different forms, including
disclosures, simplifications, warnings, reminders, social norms, and precom-
mitment strategies (pp. 26–27). Alternatively, instead of overriding System 1
thinking, other forms of nudges enlist System 1 to their advantage. For in-
stance, a graphic warning uses disgust to discourage a potentially detrimen-
tal decision, like buying a pack of cigarettes.39 Defaults exploit the human
tendency toward inertia (p. 30). They are the option we choose when we
choose to do nothing. Because so many people will simply not act, defaults
can have very powerful consequences.40
As a general matter, people tend to prefer nudges that rely on System 2
versus System 1 unless the System 1 nudge is clearly superior (pp. 140–41).
Studies show that individuals are more comfortable with nudges that en-
courage deliberation than with nudges that exploit behavioral biases.41 Even
people who are categorically skeptical of nudges or who exhibit a strong
desire for self-control do not oppose nudges that trigger System 2 (p. 147).
System 1 nudges may also garner significant public support when they target
other System 1 issues. For example, graphic warnings on cigarettes—which
solicit a visceral reaction to overcome the myopic, short-term preference for
a cigarette—were extremely popular (p. 122).
II. Ethical Nudging and Distributional Concerns
All kinds of entities can—and do—use choice architecture to influence
behavior. Yet when the government exerts influence, those situations can
raise unique ethical concerns (p. 1). Because choice architecture is ines-
capable and can carry clear benefits, Sunstein asserts that it is fruitless to ask
whether nudging is ethical. Instead, we should consider when nudging is
ethical (p. 12). The Ethics of Influence addresses the appropriate role for
nudging in the ethical state. To guide public officials on the ethics of their
actions, he introduces a novel four-value framework for evaluating potential
nudges. Although Sunstein’s approach is more theoretically nuanced and
flexible than previous accounts, it is nonetheless incomplete. In particular, it
neglects distributive-justice concerns.
39. P. 30; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 85.
40. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 83 (describing default rules as “ubiquitous and
powerful”); see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 118.
41. Pp. 34, 157; see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 150.
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A. Sunstein’s Four-Value Framework
In the past, much of the ethical discussion surrounding nudges was pri-
marily concerned with two sometimes-complementary, sometimes-conflict-
ing values: welfare (what is good for a person or for society42) and autonomy
(personal agency43), and how both values relate to paternalism.44 Econo-
mists, even behavioral ones, frequently measure welfare impacts using cost-
benefit analysis.45 Previous ethical discussions tended to focus on attempts to
influence behavior to increase welfare without compromising autonomy.46
The framework Sunstein introduces, however, is more theoretically
complex and versatile. He believes that ethical states should consider four
key values: (1) welfare, (2) autonomy, (3) dignity, and (4) self-government
(p. 3). Put differently, governments should give their citizens good lives,
protect their citizens’ freedom to choose, show respect for their citizens, and
let their citizens govern themselves (p. 3). These four values dictate which
actions governments can ethically take, including their ability to nudge
(pp. 3–4).
While Sunstein may seem at times like a welfarist whose greatest con-
cern is promoting positive outcomes (another reviewer even refers to Sun-
stein’s approach in the book as “utilitarian”),47 his theory is—at least as he
presents it—value pluralist, albeit with an occasional emphasis on welfare.
Because these different values he cites can be related, they might appear
interdependent or derivative of one another. We have already explored the
connection between welfare and autonomy. Likewise, serious violations of
dignity will also impact welfare (p. 68).48
Regardless of these synergies, Sunstein does not identify one value (or
values) as superior or inferior (p. 4). While at times linked, the four values
remain independent for purposes of his analysis. While he clearly cares
about welfare, Sunstein does not reduce affronts to dignity, autonomy, and
self-government to mere factors in a welfare calculus (pp. 15–17). This value
pluralism gives his framework depth it would not have if he had merely
attempted to fold those values into a single account of welfare. Moreover,
42. Welfare, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2d rev. ed. 2008).
43. Sarah Buss & Andrea Westlund, Personal Autonomy, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil.
(May 28, 2002) (updated June 10, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
personal-autonomy/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
44. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003).
45. Id. at 1190–93.
46. Id. at 1160 (“We propose a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that should be
acceptable to those who are firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds of either
autonomy or welfare.”).
47. See Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1072 (alluding to “Professor Sunstein’s utilitarian
approach”).
48. Sunstein, however, maintains that “[a] good welfarist should also acknowledge that
an offense to dignity is qualitatively distinct; by its very nature, it is a special sort of harm, a
different kind of loss from the loss of (say) money or an opportunity to visit a beach.” P. 68.
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value pluralism could also have wider appeal than simple welfarism. If a
nudge promotes one or more values without violating any of them, it would
appear ethical (p. 11). Likewise, if a nudge violates one or more values with-
out promoting any of them, it would appear unethical (pp. 3–4). These are
the easy cases.
Nudges will certainly offer their fair share of easy cases for Sunstein’s
four-value framework. Value pluralism’s strength is clear under these cir-
cumstances. People may very well have different ideas about which values
matter and when (pp. 13–14). Instead of quibbling over theoretical con-
cerns, policymakers can instead make progress “by seeing if some ap-
proaches compromise none of the values and can attract support from
people who are committed to all of them, or who are uncertain of their
relationship” (p. 4). For example, a good default rule that reflects most peo-
ple’s informed preferences will promote welfare while respecting autonomy
and not offending dignity (p. 176). And assuming a democratically elected
government, such a default would also uphold self-government. Thus, we
need not agree on a single underlying moral or political philosophy to reach
consensus that a given nudge is ethical or unethical.49 Value pluralism is
highly versatile.
There are, however, harder cases for value-pluralist ethical theories. The
four values in Sunstein’s taxonomy will inevitably conflict. As discussed, ef-
forts to promote welfare could sometimes infringe on autonomy. Self-gov-
ernment might also at times undermine individual dignity (p. 4). Because
no one value trumps the other, such cases are harder for value pluralism,
and the ethics of the nudging will depend on the particular nudge and its
context.
In addition to providing boundaries for ethical action, those same four
values can also function as mandates that actually require the government to
act. At times then, the ethical state will be called to action to assure it pro-
vides the kind of resources and infrastructure that allows its citizenry to lead
good, autonomous, dignified, self-governing lives (pp. 3–4, 11, 201–02). It
may not be enough then to simply promote those values; states must some-
times enable them. Under such circumstances, nudging becomes “ethically
mandatory” (p. 201). According to Sunstein, a government that has the op-
portunity but fails to adopt nudges that promote welfare, autonomy, dignity,
or self-government is not acting ethically (p. 201). In short, inaction can
also raise problems for the ethical state.
B. Distributional Concerns
Sunstein’s four-value framework offers a theoretically nuanced and flex-
ible approach to discerning when government nudges are ethical. Yet even
otherwise ethical nudges can raise distributional concerns.
49. See p. 52.
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Importantly, nudgers must decide how to nudge. And different back-
ground conditions and different baselines for different populations lead to
different “optimal” outcomes. Sunstein asks:
[H]ow does the right savings rate change when people have to pay school
loans or mortgages, or to pay for their children, young or old, healthy or
not? And how does it change for people who earn $30,000 per year, or
$60,000, or $100,000? And what is the impact of changing macroeconomic
conditions? (pp. 193–94)
Context, therefore, matters when the government is trying to decide which
course of action is best for its citizens.50 The reality is that—despite the
unblinking acceptance of nudges as effective policy interventions51—the
same nudges do not work equally well for all citizens. Nudges in certain
contexts can fail some of our most vulnerable citizens, either by leaving
them behind or by harming them outright.
1. Leaving Vulnerable People Behind
One way for nudges to fail is to be ineffective. Responding to the low
take-up rates of potentially highly beneficial programs is one of the reasons
Sunstein gives for nudging in the first place (pp. 10–11). By neglecting the
distributive effects of nudges, we may unwittingly be creating or perpetuat-
ing social disparities. Insofar as nudges are supposed to improve the lives of
citizens, entrenching existing inequalities—or worse yet creating new ones—
runs counter to the well-intentioned purpose of nudging.
These kinds of distributive justice concerns raised by nudges are not
mere conjecture. For example, employer-provided wellness programs typi-
cally employ nudging strategies, such as group health challenges (attempting
to create a positive herd mentality) and biometric screenings (providing
health-related information as a potential “boost”), to encourage their em-
ployees to adopt healthier behaviors.52 These tactics are undoubtedly in-
tended to activate System 2 reasoning to lead to healthier decisions. While
employers and health insurers are private entities, in drafting the Affordable
Care Act, Congress included incentives for adopting wellness initiatives.53
The government was thus nudging the nudgers. Studies have found, how-
ever, that wellness programs have more engagement and greater success for
advantaged populations, including people who are already healthy, people
who work at white-collar jobs, people who occupy management-level posi-
tions, and people who have obtained some higher education.54 Sadly, lower-
income Americans are simultaneously more likely to be in poor health (and
50. P. 194 (explaining that what constitutes the “best” contribution rate depends on
context).
51. Rachlinski says, “Despite concerns about whether governments should use nudges,
no one truly questions the efficacy of nudges. Nudges work.” Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1066.
52. See Roberts & Fowler, supra note 18, at 107–08.
53. Id. at 106–10.
54. Id. at 112.
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thus in need of policy interventions) and less likely to be engaged in wellness
programs.55 Thus, even if employer-provided wellness programs can success-
fully engage System 2 for a significant portion of the population, they may
still fail to successfully nudge certain disadvantaged groups. To make matters
worse, successfully nudging the advantaged while leaving the disadvantaged
behind threatens to exacerbate existing health disparities.
2. Generating Harm
In addition to merely failing to benefit vulnerable populations, nudges
can also sometimes do them harm. Consider another example of nudging by
employers: automatic enrollment in savings plans.56 Sunstein cites research
in the United Kingdom studying people’s reaction to being automatically
enrolled in a suboptimal savings plan with an unusually high contribution
rate (pp. 174–75). The study found that the employees who were most likely
to remain with the default had lower average salaries.57 Put differently,
lower-income employees are slower to opt out of unfavorable defaults than
higher-income employees.58 Sunstein notes that “[s]imilar findings have
been made elsewhere, with growing evidence that those who are less edu-
cated, and less sophisticated, are more likely to stick with the default” (pp.
174–75). Sunstein calls the tendency of poorer people to stay with even det-
rimental defaults a “puzzling and somewhat troubling implication” (p. 175).
The defaults could then have a regressive effect on poor people in some cases
because those individuals both have less money to spend and are more likely
to stay with a suboptimal default option (p. 175).
Sunstein recognizes these possible distributional consequences. Take for
example a green-energy plan that costs more up front yet saves twice as
much in the longer term.59 In discussing a similar scenario, Sunstein explains
that, even if the welfare calculus tips in favor of the green-energy option,
“[i]f poor people would in fact be net losers but would not opt out, the
argument for a green default is weakened” (p. 179). To account for the po-
tential distributive-justice issues, Sunstein recommends exploring the need
for subsidies or transparent opportunities to opt out (p. 179).
III. Nudge-Proof Populations and Distributive Justice
To recap, nudges are choice-preserving policy interventions designed to
steer people in the right direction. According to Sunstein, a state that wishes
to act ethically must consider at least four values when deciding whether to
55. Id.
56. Again, the government can nudge the employer to nudge the employee. See p. 121
n.15.
57. John Beshears et al., The Limitations of Defaults 3 (2010), http://
www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/orrc10-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U5P-LLDX].
58. Id.
59. Sunstein includes a similar example on page 172.
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nudge its citizens: welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government. Yet re-
search shows that certain vulnerable populations, such as low-income indi-
viduals, may not be as responsive to nudging as their more privileged
counterparts. These low take-up rates among those in greatest need could
potentially exacerbate existing disparities, as well as produce independent
harms. Greater attention to distributional concerns could thus lead to
smarter nudges that could do even more good. To reap these benefits, we
must first understand what renders some people “nudge-proof” and then
consider the implications of nudge-proof populations for the ethical state.
A. Why Are Some Populations Nudge-Proof?
In their seminal 2008 book Nudge, Sunstein and his coauthor Richard
Thaler make this assertion: “The bottom line, from our point of view, is that
people are, shall we say, nudge-able.”60 But is everyone equally nudge-able?
Under the right circumstances, all people might be coercible. They might
even be manipulable. Nudges, however, are supposed to have a lighter touch.
Despite the widespread popularity and proven effectiveness of nudges, re-
search shows that they do not universally benefit everyone. Recall that lower-
income employees were less likely to engage in employer-provided wellness
programs and that “those who are less educated, and less sophisticated, are
more likely to stick with the default” (p. 175). I propose that there is some-
thing about these populations that makes them immune to particular kinds
of nudges. They are nudge-proof.
People can be nudge-proof in at least two ways. In the context of educa-
tive nudges, nudge-proof individuals lack the capacity to act on the informa-
tion they receive from the boost. In the case of defaults, nudge-proof people
will fail to opt out, even when the default is suboptimal. Arguably, in the
latter context, the nudge is “working” in the sense that individuals are suc-
cumbing to the default option. The ability to opt out of a default is essential
to the “choice-preserving” aspect of nudges. These populations are therefore
nudge-proof because they have little to no choice to preserve. They could
very much want to opt out of the default yet face significant prohibitive
barriers. Both situations arise from external constraints on decisionmaking.
To understand why certain groups under certain circumstances are
nudge-proof, we must go back to the reasons why nudges work in the first
place. As discussed in Part I, nudges target suboptimal decisionmaking that
is the result of cognitive quirks. Chapters in Thaler and Sunstein’s book have
titles like “Biases and Blunders,” “Resisting Temptation,” and “Following the
Herd.”61 The assumption underlying the lion’s share of scholarship on
nudges is that the behavioral market failures that nudges seek to correct are
the result of internal processing errors, which result from things like present
bias, unrealistic optimism, loss aversion, inertia, automatic thinking, and
guilt or peer pressure.
60. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 37.
61. See id. at v.
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Take Thaler and Sunstein’s discussion of being overweight. They note
that, given soaring obesity rates, it seems apparent that a majority of Ameri-
cans are not making optimal eating choices.62 The primary culprits that they
identify for this trend are conformity or social influence (e.g., describing
obesity as “contagious” because “you’re more likely to be overweight if you
have a lot of overweight friends”)63 and issues with self-control (e.g., offering
the hint that “if you would like to lose weight, get smaller plates, buy little
packages of what you like, and don’t keep tempting food in the refrigera-
tor”).64 Hence, a would-be nudger, like an employer-provided wellness pro-
gram, might respond by adopting a weight-loss challenge that attempts to
harness the herd mentality to promote weight loss, or it might opt to offer
healthier options in its vending machines and on-site cafeteria. As I will
discuss, one of these weight-loss nudges is clearly superior from a distribu-
tive-justice perspective.
The success of defaults also relies on certain assumptions about how
people make decisions. The idea behind defaults is to pick the option that
will nudge most people in the right direction while preserving choice
through the opportunity to opt out. Sunstein proposes that people may stick
with defaults—perhaps even bad ones—for a variety of reasons (pp.
169–73). Procrastination and inertia are significant reasons why defaults
work.65 Yet nudgers assume that people will accept a default only up until a
point and then they will opt out. Sunstein asserts that “[i]f a default rule
really makes people uncomfortable, they will reject it” (p. 174). He main-
tains that those situations will overcome inertia, loss aversion, and guilt (p.
174).
Assumptions about why people make the choices they do underlie both
System 2 and System 1 nudges.66 To be sure, it is tempting to blame self-
defeating choices on our invariably flawed cognitive tendencies. For exam-
ple, in his review of The Ethics of Influence, Jeffrey Rachlinski writes, “Poor
individuals might feel that they need the savings that come with the dirty
energy plan but procrastinate and lose out on the savings for long peri-
ods.”67 But, if instead of weighing the costs and benefits of gray versus green
energy lower-income people are caring for their children or working second
jobs, it hardly seems fair to characterize their behavior as procrastination.
Many suboptimal decisions may in fact be the result of cognitive quirks like
present bias and inertia. Sometimes, however, the root cause of behavioral
market failures will be external—not internal—factors.68
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 55, 64.
64. Id. at 44.
65. P. 171 (“Studies of brain activity find that when decisions are complex and difficult,
people are more likely to stick with the default.”).
66. See p. 34.
67. Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1069.
68. I originally made an argument along these lines with respect to wellness programs.
See Roberts & Fowler, supra note 18, at 101.
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In short, choice architecture assumes the ability to choose. That said,
several factors can impinge on choice. Everyone does not have access to the
same set of options. To use a common example, consider the lifestyle
changes required to get in shape. It is far easier for a higher-income, single
young professional who has a flexible schedule and lives in a posh apartment
with a gym to work out regularly than for a lower-income, single parent
who cannot afford childcare, who lacks transportation to a gym, and who
lives in an unsafe neighborhood without decent sidewalks or green spaces.
Imagine both these individuals work in the same company—albeit in very
different positions—and are encouraged to participate in a physical activity
challenge. Should we expect them to respond in the same way? As discussed,
research already tells us that they will not.
Put another way, all individuals are not equally autonomous. Martha
Albertson Fineman explains that autonomy has meaning only “in situations
in which individual choices are not made impossible, constrained by ine-
qualities, particularly those inequalities that arise from poverty.”69 Making
good choices requires a certain baseline in terms of basic health, money, and
time. This reality is not lost on Sunstein. He acknowledges that time and
attention are scarce resources, the absence of which can limit autonomy (pp.
24, 61, 181). He even notes that one reason poorer people may stay with
suboptimal defaults could be their relative lack of time: “One reason may be
that low-income workers have a great deal to worry about and so are less
likely to take the trouble to think through and to alter the default rule” (p.
175; footnote omitted).
But this reality is true for other kinds of resources as well. Economists
frame these additional factors that can impede optimal decisionmaking as
“effort taxes.”70 Sunstein explains that “[a]n ‘effort tax’ may seem especially
high for, and have an especially large adverse effect on, people who are al-
ready facing a large number of difficult or life-stabilizing decisions and
costs” (p. 175). If the effort tax gets too high, the suboptimal default could
be the only practically available option.71 Socioeconomic factors and struc-
tural barriers, not cognitive errors or biases, may be the true reason for the
behavioral market failure.72
Take the observation from Thaler and Sunstein’s early work that being
overweight correlates with socializing with other overweight people.73 Yes,
perhaps part of the puzzle is in-group norms and herd mentality. Yet there
could be other common denominators as well. Human beings tend to social-
ize with people who are in proximity to us, like family and neighbors, and so
maybe the reason that certain social groups tend to be overweight is the
result of a shared experience of living in a food desert without opportunities
69. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency
30 (2004).
70. See p. 175.
71. See id.
72. Roberts & Fowler, supra note 18, at 116–19.
73. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 55, 64.
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for exercise. When nudges respond to behavioral market failures without
providing the necessary infrastructure and resources, some members of the
targeted group may well be rendered nudge-proof.
It is worth emphasizing that being nudge-proof is not a permanent sta-
tus, nor is it a binary. It is situational and exists on a continuum. In studying
why some nudges do not work, research has revealed that people with less
income, sophistication, and education may not respond in the desired way
to nudging.74 Really, any group that faces disproportional burdens could be
nudge-proof under the right circumstances, including women, people of
color, and people with disabilities. Also, being nudge-proof in one context
does not make someone nudge-proof across the board. A person who can-
not afford fruits and vegetables may still read labels and opt to avoid GMOs
in the food products she buys. She has been nudged in one way but not in
the other. Finally, because being nudge-proof is the result of external factors,
a change in circumstances—like a higher-paying job—may be enough to
move a person from nudge-proof to nudge-able.
B. Distributive Justice as an Independent Value
Nudge-proof populations complicate the ethics of nudging. Distributive
justice is a well-accepted ethical principle that requires the just distribution
of benefits and burdens among members of society.75 Being attuned to dis-
tributional concerns could lead to more effective nudging. Consequently, I
advocate considering distributive justice in addition to welfare, autonomy,
dignity, and self-government when assessing the ethics of nudging.
Although he does not address distributional concerns head on, Sunstein
recognizes that an ethical state might want to promote fair distribution:
Perhaps some people are poor and other people are rich, and perhaps that
inequality reflects unfairness. Perhaps some people are subject to system-
atic inequality, perhaps because they lack decent opportunities, perhaps
because they are disabled, perhaps because of the color of their skin. An
ethical state might want to take steps to help. (p. 20)
Even in his very early work on nudging, Sunstein was sensitive to distribu-
tive justice.76 Yet despite acknowledging the importance of distributional
concerns, Sunstein does not treat distributive justice as an independent value
in his four-value framework. Instead, he folds distributional issues into his
analysis of autonomy and of dignity. For example, he writes, “People who
are subject to violence, uneducated, or desperately poor cannot be autono-
mous, or cannot enjoy such autonomy as they may have. A dignified life
74. See p. 174–75.
75. Brian Caterino, Distributive Justice, Encyclopedia of Pol. Sci. (George Thomas
Kurian et al. eds., 2011) http://dx/doi.org/10.4135/9781608712434 (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
76. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 242.
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requires background conditions and social support” (p. 4). Likewise, he as-
serts that “[m]any nudges combat discrimination on the basis of race, relig-
ion, and sex, and help people who face severe economic deprivation; they
promote dignity” (pp. 201–02). It would then not be fair to say that Sun-
stein’s approach ignores distributive justice. His framework merely fails to
give distributive justice specific attention on par with welfare, autonomy,
dignity, and self-government.
From an ethical standpoint, issues of distributive justice can be particu-
larly problematic when welfare is the primary guiding value. First, welfarists,
for whom Pareto improvement is the gold standard of policy analysis, may
not recognize widening disparities as ethically problematic. A Pareto im-
provement occurs when at least one person is made better off and no one is
made worse off.77 Thus, a nudge that successfully nudges advantaged popu-
lations while leaving behind disadvantaged individuals may still be Pareto
improving. For example, requiring grocery stores to feature healthier op-
tions more prominently will not nudge people who cannot afford those
items. The nudge-proof populations will then stay at their prenudge base-
lines, while the nudge-able populations—albeit perhaps slowly—reap the
benefits of healthier food choices. If anyone in the population gets nudged,
the result is a welfare gain.
But even Pareto-improving interventions can create or exacerbate social
inequalities. Imagine that starting in the Middle Ages one single population
was consistently left behind by interventions that made them no worse off
but that moved everyone else, slowly over time, into the modern era. That
population would have no indoor plumbing, a heightened risk of infectious
disease, and a life expectancy of around thirty-one years of age.78 A mean-
ingful concept of distributive justice surely would not tolerate such an
outcome.
The notion that inequalities may raise distributional concerns is not
new. Some versions of distributive justice, including the one adopted here,
require a baseline of equality. Perhaps most notably, renowned political phi-
losopher G.A. Cohen argues that deep inequalities—regardless of their
Pareto effects—violate distributive justice principles.79 As one commentator
puts it, “Justice requires equality, and Pareto improvements have nothing to
do with equality, and thus nothing to do with justice.”80 If nudge-proof indi-
viduals do not stand to benefit from policy interventions—even if they are
not outright harmed by them—and more affluent, nudge-able people enjoy
increasingly better lives, we will further increase the gap between the haves
and the have-nots. Once this gap gets sufficiently wide, distributive justice
77. Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1106–07 (1982) (book review).
78. Health: A Millennium of Health Improvement, BBC News (Dec. 27, 1998, 5:56 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/241864.stm [https://perma.cc/R6H9-FHYL].
79. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008).
80. Jonathan Quong, Justice Beyond Equality, 36 Soc. Theory & Prac. 315, 331 (2010)
(reviewing Cohen, supra note 79).
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issues arise. Unfortunately, our existing disparities are already quite alarm-
ing. Compared to its sister countries, the United States already falls dead last
in terms of poverty and inequality indicators.81 We must then ask ourselves
whether it is ethical to adopt social policies that could leave behind our
neediest citizens.
Moreover, even seemingly Pareto-improving events could actually result
in welfare losses. Imagine walking into a room full of kindergarteners who
each have a cookie and then giving an additional cookie to all but a handful
of the children. Would the single-cookie havers—or their parents for that
matter—find comfort in knowing that giving an additional cookie to their
peers made them no worse off? Probably not. Humans are notoriously com-
parative thinkers. This is particularly true with respect to positional goods,
whose value comes largely from the sense of social status that comes from
possessing them (while others do not). For instance, how happy a person is
with her house depends on how it compares to her neighbors’ houses.82
Consider that much of the acrimony surrounding the 2016 presidential elec-
tion came from certain groups of Americans feeling that they had been left
behind.83 Hence, the idea that a policy intervention could move some people
forward without impacting the welfare of those it neglects could be largely
hypothetical. People may experience welfare losses when they believe that
others are improving and they are not, even if they are no worse off.
Second, even in cases like the U.K. retirement savings study where vul-
nerable populations are clearly worse off (pp. 174–75), welfarist analysis falls
short because it fails to fully capture distributional concerns. Utilitarian wel-
farism, which seeks to promote the greatest good for the greatest number,84
notoriously masks distributional concerns. If enough of the population is
even slightly better off but a handful of people are significantly worse off, the
result could still be a net welfare gain sufficient to justify the policy
intervention.
81. David B. Grusky et al., Executive Summary, Pathways, 2016, at 5.
82. Thomas Aronsson & Andrea Mannberg, Positional Preferences for Hous-
ing: Income Taxation as a Second-Best Policy? 2 (2014), https://www.diva-portal.org/
smash/get/diva2:739555/FULLTEXT01.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9K4-XAAN].
83. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Feeling Let Down and Left Behind, with Little Hope for Bet-
ter, N.Y. Times (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/us/feeling-let-down-
and-left-behind-with-little-hope-for-better.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review);
Juana Summers, The ‘Forgotten Tribe’ in West Virginia; Why America’s White Working Class
Feels Left Behind, CNN (Sept. 20, 2016, 9:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/
election-2016-white-working-class-donald-trump-kaiser-family-foundation/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZZT4-QSSR]; Brian Wagner, Democrats and the Plight of Rural America,
Huffington Post (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-and-
the-plight-of-rural-america_us_57daddc1e4b053b1ccf29524 [https://perma.cc/F58N-L3VJ];
Helping Rural America Catch Up, N.Y. Times (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2016/09/19/prosperity-is-up-but-not-for-rural-america/invest-in-green-and-
connected-jobs-and-opportunities-for-young-people [https://perma.cc/L7KX-SM98].
84. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Leg-
islation 5 n.1 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789).
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Consider the green-energy example. If a person cannot afford the initial
investment, she will be unable to enjoy the savings down the line (p. 172).
Moreover, if she tries to make those heightened payments, she might find
herself deciding between electricity and food. While the green-energy plan
might be a great option for most people and for the planet, it could be a
terrible option for at least some people. In deciding to nudge people toward
green energy, a utilitarian welfarist might look only to the overall environ-
mental and savings impacts without appreciating that some individuals will
be substantially worse off. Martha Nussbaum notes that, through the process
of aggregating welfare, utilitarianism fails to explain “who has got the money
and whether any of it is mine.”85
Consequently, Sunstein’s four-part ethical framework could benefit
from an additional value: distributive justice. Value-pluralist models like
Sunstein’s leave room to consider additional values. As noted, he already
engages with distributive justice at various times in The Ethics of Influence.86
And distributive justice surely has autonomy, dignity, and even welfare im-
plications. The full extent of the potential distributional issues may not be
apparent from simply looking to these other values. Take a policy of promi-
nently featuring health food at the grocery store. As noted, the result is likely
a welfare gain for people who are nudge-able. Moreover, it would be strange
to say that putting produce at the front of the store compromises autonomy
because it fails to limit choice in any tangible way. Likewise, it does not
offend dignity by undermining agency or failing to treat people as full per-
sons. (Just for good measure, assuming people care about healthy eating and
playing a part in selecting their public officials, self-government is also prob-
ably not implicated here.) Under Sunstein’s framework then, the nudge
would be unquestionably ethical. It promotes welfare and violates none of
the other values.
Adding distributive justice to the picture creates an additional level of
depth. It requires would-be nudgers to ask themselves, Is there a nudge that
we could adopt that may better serve our goals? Of course, in a value plural-
ist framework, no single value is dispositive.87 Thus, while the inability of
some people to afford healthy food might implicate distributive justice, it
does not mean that the grocery store nudge is unethical. After all, choice
architecture is inevitable—the fruits and the vegetables have to go some-
where in the store—so we might as well use that reality to make an improve-
ment even if it raises minor distributional concerns.
When adopting interventions, policymakers should also consider that
some nudges actually promote distributive justice by removing structural
barriers or narrowing disparities. In fact, some nudges might benefit vulner-
able populations more than their privileged counterparts. Let’s return to the
employer responding to nudges from the government to improve the health
85. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 281
(1997) (quoting Charles Dickens, Hard Times 56–57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1854)).
86. See supra text accompanying note 76.
87. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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of its employees. We encountered two potential healthy eating nudges: (1)
creating a weight loss challenge designed to use the herd mentality and (2)
providing healthy options in the vending machines and cafeteria to rely on
automatic thinking (it turns out most of us will eat what is in front of us).88
As explained, the weight-loss challenge could raise distributional con-
cerns because all employees will not have access to the same eating and exer-
cise options when they leave work. Of course, as explained above, the mere
fact that only white-collar workers are the primary beneficiaries of these
policies does not, in and of itself, render them unethical.
By contrast, making affordable—or better yet free—healthy snacks
available to employees not only nudges them in favor of selecting those
foods but actually creates a fairly distributed opportunity to make healthier
eating decisions. Nudges that increase the opportunities to make better
choices will enhance autonomy.89 Autonomy-enhancing nudges could actu-
ally have a progressive (as opposed to a regressive) impact on certain popu-
lations. For instance, the employee who cannot afford healthy snacks on her
own might derive a greater relative benefit from her employer’s policy than
her more affluent coworkers.
Defaults could also be used to promote distributive justice. Imagine a
government program that took a modest donation from the tax returns of
high-income individuals and put that money toward a local food bank. De-
faults could also better serve distributive justice, as Sunstein has suggested
(pp. 179, 185), by offering subsidies, making opting out relatively costless
(pp. 161–62), and tailoring defaults to specific populations (p. 183). (But in
making these adjustments, policymakers must be careful not to compromise
the benefits of having a default in the first place.)
The idea of nudges with positive distributive effects is not merely wish-
ful thinking. Some popular nudges, like automatic voter registration to im-
prove turnout (p. 14) and raising the number of free testing reports that
college hopefuls can send to schools to increase applications for lower-in-
come students,90 already function to promote distributive justice because
they reduce the structural barriers certain populations will encounter in reg-
istering to vote and applying to college.
Of course, just as some nudges will not implicate welfare, autonomy,
dignity, and self-government, not all nudges will raise distributive justice
concerns. For example, defaulting printers to print double-sided to save pa-
per (p. 163) appears to have no distributional impacts one way or another.
But regardless of whether a particular nudge violates distributive justice,
promotes it, or has no effect, those conversations are worth having indepen-
dent of Sunstein’s four other values.
88. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 43.
89. In other work, a coauthor and I have called these kinds of interventions “autonomy
enhancing.” Roberts & Fowler, supra note 18; see also Jessica L. Roberts & Dave Fagundes,
When Nudges Become Shoves: Distributive Justice, Libertarian Paternalism, and the HUD Smoke-
Free Policy (Sept. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
90. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 15.
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Conclusion: From Nudge-Proof to Nudge-able
Cass R. Sunstein’s The Ethics of Influence makes a significant contribu-
tion to the ongoing discussion surrounding nudges as policy interventions.
When the government does the nudging, it can raise unique ethical con-
cerns. Sunstein’s simple yet elegant value-pluralist framework provides an
important foundation for exploring the limits and the obligations of the
ethical state with respect to nudging. He encourages policymakers to look to
four key values—welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government—when
considering whether to act. But even otherwise ethical seeming nudges can
raise distributional concerns. Some people lack the resources or the oppor-
tunities to make better choices, and sticky defaults can do more harm than
good for already disadvantaged populations. Consequently, in this Review, I
have encouraged would-be nudgers to add a fifth value to their calculus:
distributive justice. If we choose to incorporate distributive justice as an in-
dependent value alongside welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government,
how would that change the analysis?
To start, certain nudges will not implicate distributive justice one way or
another. Other nudges will, in fact, promote distributive justice by improv-
ing access to resources and narrowing disparities. And, of course, some
nudges will threaten to undermine distributive justice, even if only slightly.
Yet herein lies the beauty of a value-pluralist model. Policymakers will not
decide in favor or against a given nudge on a single ethical consideration.
Even nudges with potentially negative distributional impacts could still be
ethical, all things considered.
These conversations are important. While one benefit of nudges is their
relatively low cost to implement, they are not (despite suggestions to the
contrary) costless.91 Surely it cost taxpayers something when President
Obama convened a group of thought leaders to discuss the power of nudges.
After such meetings, policymakers and public officials must actually design
and implement the nudges that are discussed. And later down the line, re-
searchers and analysts will need to assess their effectiveness. Put simply,
nudges have hidden costs. There is no such thing as a free nudge.
All policymakers must confront issues of resource allocation. When the
government devotes time, money, and brainpower to certain kinds of
nudges, it funnels those resources away from developing other policies.
Some of the concerns outlined here are simply outside the scope of nudging.
Widespread injustices, like income and health disparities, are larger social
problems that nudges cannot hope to solve entirely. At a minimum, how-
ever, the government as an agent of the people has an obligation to consider
the distributional consequences of its policies. Moreover, distributional con-
cerns like the ones outlined here can be studied, understood, and addressed.
Distributive justice should not be dispositive, but it should certainly join
91. But see Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 13 (“[M]any of those policies cost little
or nothing; they impose no burden on taxpayers at all.”).
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welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government in the pantheon of values
considered by the ethical state.
